Open government and corporate misconduct: Evidence from China

Zeyu Sun, Ye Zhou and Xiaoguang Yang

Finance Research Letters, 2025, vol. 75, issue C

Abstract: This study investigates the impact of open government on corporate monitoring. By leveraging the staggered rollout of open government data platforms across various cities in China as a natural experiment, we find that this policy significantly reduces corporate misconduct in cities with the initiative compared to those without. The monitoring effect is driven by enhanced public scrutiny and increased information transparency. Additionally, the impact of open government is more pronounced for firms with lower data acquisition capabilities, state-owned, in more competitive industries, and in regions with higher local government credibility.

Keywords: Open government; Corporate misconduct; Information transparency; Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:75:y:2025:i:c:s1544612325000923

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2025.106827

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