Does firm heterogeneity lead to differences in relative executive compensation?

Ana Albuquerque

Finance Research Letters, 2010, vol. 7, issue 2, 80-85

Abstract: Cost heterogeneity is an important source of performance disparity among firms. This heterogeneity conditions the strategic decisions that firms make in the product market and can lead to heterogeneity in the design of managerial compensation contracts. I investigate the effect of cost heterogeneity in a strategic product market environment where firms compete à la Cournot. The paper offers new predictions on how executive compensation contracts that account for relative performance must be adjusted for cost differences.

Keywords: Cost; heterogeneity; Strategic; decisions; Managerial; compensation; Relative; performance; evaluation; Firm; heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:7:y:2010:i:2:p:80-85

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