Exploring the nexus of executive incentives and corporate innovation efficiency: The moderating role of internal governance factors

Yifan Jiang

Finance Research Letters, 2025, vol. 81, issue C

Abstract: Using a dataset spanning 2012–2022 from China's A-share listed companies, this study investigates the intricate relationship between executive incentives and corporate innovation efficiency. It further explores the moderating effect of internal corporate governance mechanisms. Findings underscore the crucial role of executive incentives in boosting innovation efficiency. Specifically, agency costs have a positive moderating effect, whereas equity concentration has a negative one. Additionally, executive incentives indirectly boost innovation efficiency by fostering team stability.

Keywords: Executive equity incentives; Executive compensation incentives; Equity concentration; Innovation efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:81:y:2025:i:c:s1544612325002739

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2025.107009

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