Negotiating M&As under uncertainty: The influence of managerial flexibility on the first-mover advantage

Elmar Lukas and Andreas Welling

Finance Research Letters, 2012, vol. 9, issue 1, 29-35

Abstract: Using a dynamic real options approach we show that managerial flexibility is strengthening the first-mover advantage in bargaining M&As by undermining the bargaining power of the second mover.

Keywords: Real option; Game theory; Merger & Acquisition; Negotiation; Flexibility; Ultimatum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D81 G13 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:9:y:2012:i:1:p:29-35

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2011.09.002

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