Informed trading around acquisitions: Evidence from corporate bonds

Simi Kedia and Xing Zhou

Journal of Financial Markets, 2014, vol. 18, issue C, 182-205

Abstract: This paper examines the prevalence of informed trading in corporate bonds prior to takeover announcements. We find significant pre-announcement trading activities and price movements in target bonds, in directions consistent with the nature of pending information. Improved transparency in the bond markets achieved by the implementation of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system reduces the incidence of informed trading. Further, there is some weak evidence that dealers affiliated with merger and acquisition advisors sell in anticipation of negative news, pointing to a possible channel of information leakage. Such negative news seems to be incorporated into bond prices no slower than into the target stocks.

Keywords: Informed trading; Merger and acquisition; Corporate bond market; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finmar:v:18:y:2014:i:c:p:182-205

DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2013.07.002

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