Pre-trade transparency and informed trading: Experimental evidence on undisclosed orders

Arie E. Gozluklu

Journal of Financial Markets, 2016, vol. 28, issue C, 91-115

Abstract: I use experimental asset markets to analyze trading under different transparency and information settings. I find that both liquidity and informed traders use undisclosed orders to compete for liquidity provision. In opaque markets, traders increase aggressiveness to improve execution probability. Without information friction, market opacity enhances liquidity, especially toward the end of trading, and is beneficial for liquidity traders. Under informed trading, adverse selection drives market outcomes mainly around news announcements. Monopolistic insiders exploit opacity at the expense of large liquidity traders. Opacity does not affect informational efficiency with a monopolistic insider, but value discovery is faster when informational rents are shared.

Keywords: Undisclosed orders; Hidden liquidity; Information asymmetry; Market opacity; Insider trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finmar:v:28:y:2016:i:c:p:91-115

DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2016.03.003

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