Do analysts distribute negative opinions earlier?

Yanhua Sunny Yang and Chris Yung

Journal of Financial Markets, 2024, vol. 67, issue C

Abstract: We examine analysts’ forecast timing when issuing negative opinions. When management withholds bad news, good news become more abundant but relatively uninformative. We theoretically predict and empirically document that analysts treat observed bad news as having higher precision and respond to it by issuing forecasts more quickly and accurately than for good news forecasts. These results hold to various robustness checks. This study improves our understanding of negative information dissemination in capital markets.

Keywords: Financial analysts; Negative opinions; Forecast timing; Forecast accuracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S138641812300054X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finmar:v:67:y:2024:i:c:s138641812300054x

DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100856

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Financial Markets is currently edited by B. Lehmann, D. Seppi and A. Subrahmanyam

More articles in Journal of Financial Markets from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().