Stabilizing the financial markets through communication and informed trading

Qi Guo, Huang, Shao’an and Gaowang Wang

Journal of Financial Markets, 2024, vol. 69, issue C

Abstract: We develop a model of government intervention with information disclosure in which a government with two private signals trades directly in financial markets to stabilize asset prices. Government intervention through informed trading stabilizes financial markets and affects market quality through a noise channel and an information channel. Information disclosure negatively affects financial stability by deteriorating the information advantages of the government, while its final effects on market quality hinge on the relative sizes of the noise effect and the information effect. Under different information disclosure scenarios, there are potential tradeoffs between financial stability and price efficiency.

Keywords: Government intervention; Information disclosure; Financial stability; Price efficiency; Market liquidity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 G1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Stabilizing the Financial Markets through Communication and Informed Trading (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finmar:v:69:y:2024:i:c:s1386418124000156

DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2024.100897

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