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Rethinking the regulatory treatment of securitization

Vittoria Cerasi and Jean Rochet

Journal of Financial Stability, 2014, vol. 10, issue C, 20-31

Abstract: In a model where banks play an active role in monitoring borrowers, we analyze the impact of securitization on bankers’ incentives across different macroeconomic scenarios. We show that securitization can be part of the optimal financing scheme for banks, provided banks retain an equity tranche in the sold loans to maintain proper incentives. In economic downturns however securitization should be restricted. The implementation of the optimal solvency scheme is achieved by setting appropriate capital charges through a form of capital insurance, protecting the value of bank capital in downturns, while providing additional liquidity in upturns.

Keywords: Solvency regulation; Securitization; Capital insurance; Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finsta:v:10:y:2014:i:c:p:20-31

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2012.10.002

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