Components of credit rationing

Mehdi Beyhaghi, Fathali Firoozi, Abol Jalilvand and Laleh Samarbakhsh

Journal of Financial Stability, 2020, vol. 50, issue C

Abstract: Credit rationing by lending institutions has been the subject of much research in recent decades. Although there are some empirical indications, there is little theoretical justification about how various forms of credit rationing manifest themselves in credit markets. Understanding how these forms emerge in the market is particularly important for regulators in charge of monetary policy who play a crucial role in attaining economic and financial stability during crises and pandemics. This study first offers a theoretical decomposition of credit rationing by showing that three forms of equilibrium credit rationing can exist in the presence of contract heterogeneity. It then provides empirical evidence on each of the three rationing forms using micro-level data on small- and medium-sized enterprises collected by the European Central Bank over the period 2009–2019.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Credit rationing; Credit risk; Incentive compatibility; Optimal contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G21 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finsta:v:50:y:2020:i:c:s1572308920300619

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2020.100762

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