Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy

Massimiliano Affinito and Edoardo Tagliaferri

Journal of Financial Stability, 2010, vol. 6, issue 4, 189-202

Abstract: This paper investigates the ex ante determinants of bank loan securitization by using different econometric methods on Italian individual bank data from 2000 to 2006. Our results show that bank loan securitization is a composite decision. Banks that are less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and burdened with troubled loans are more likely to perform securitization, for a larger amount and earlier.

Keywords: Originate-to-distribute; (O&D); Loan; Securitization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finsta:v:6:y:2010:i:4:p:189-202

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