The demand for central clearing: To clear or not to clear, that is the question!

Mario Bellia, Giulio Girardi, Roberto Panzica, Loriana Pelizzon and Tuomas Peltonen

Journal of Financial Stability, 2024, vol. 72, issue C

Abstract: This paper empirically analyses whether post-global financial crisis regulatory reforms have created appropriate incentives to voluntarily centrally clear over-the-counter (OTC) derivative contracts. We use confidential European trade repository data on single-name sovereign credit default swap (CDS) transactions and show that both seller and buyer manage counterparty exposures and capital costs, strategically choosing to clear when the counterparty is riskier. The clearing incentives seem particularly responsive to seller credit risk, which is in line with the notion that counterparty credit risk (CCR) is asymmetric in CDS contracts. The riskiness of the underlying reference entity also impacts the decision to clear as it affects both CCR capital charges for OTC contracts and central counterparty clearing house (CCP) margins for cleared contracts. Lastly, we find evidence that when a transaction helps netting positions with the CCP and hence lower margins, the likelihood of clearing is higher.

Keywords: Credit default swap (CDS); Central counterparty clearing house (CCP); European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR); Sovereign CDS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G18 G28 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The demand for central clearing: To clear or not to clear, that is the question (2022)
Working Paper: The demand for central clearing: to clear or not to clear, that is the question (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finsta:v:72:y:2024:i:c:s1572308924000329

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101247

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