 Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber marketAhmed Barkaoui and Arnaud Z. Dragicevic Forest Policy and Economics, 2016, vol. 69, issue C, 90-100 Abstract: By considering the French forest-based sector, we study both negotiation and renegotiation between a public timber and roundwood log supplier, which can be either public-interest-oriented or profit-maximizing, and a profit-maximizing lumber manufacturer. We first prove that the Nash bargaining game yields a unique equilibrium log supply contract, at which the negotiation takes only place on the prices. We then find that the expected profit-maximizing is achieved when the supplier's public interest and the manufacturer's bargaining power are strategic substitutes. The renegotiation reveals the presence of a memory effect over the quantities issued from bargaining. Our results can be generalized to all economic settings that revolve around public interest and commodity risk management. Keywords: Operational research; Nash bargaining; Renegotiation; Social preferences; Supply contracts; Forest-based sector (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:forpol:v:69:y:2016:i:c:p:90-100 DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.04.007 Access Statistics for this article Forest Policy and Economics is currently edited by M. Krott More articles in Forest Policy and Economics from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.