The United States-Canada softwood lumber trade: An actual versus optimal export tax

Rajan Parajuli, Sudipta Sarangi, Sun Joseph Chang and Carter Hill

Forest Policy and Economics, 2016, vol. 73, issue C, 112-119

Abstract: By developing a two-country two-stage game model, this study examines an optimal level of export tax under the framework of the 2006 United States (U.S.)-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA 2006). The theoretical results suggest that marginal lumber production costs in Canada and U.S. lumber production capacity along with linear demand parameters determine an optimum rate of export tax on Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. The empirical estimation reveals that the monthly optimal export tax during the SLA 2006 period follows the actual export tax closely with a monthly rate ranging from −4% to 19%.

Keywords: Softwood lumber; Optimal export tax; Softwood Lumber Agreement 2006; Two-stage game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 F18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:forpol:v:73:y:2016:i:c:p:112-119

DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.08.009

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