Forestry auctions with interdependent values: Evidence from timber auctions

Didier Tatoutchoup

Forest Policy and Economics, 2017, vol. 80, issue C, 107-115

Abstract: This article exploits first-price sealed-bid auctions data from the U.S. Forest Service to find through a semi-parametric estimation evidence of interdependent values in the bidding behavior in the Forestry. Under this assumption, a theoretical model is developed for forest land auctions such that management of the forest is released to the winning firm. I characterize in the first-price auctions the optimal rotation as well as the reservation price. A calibration of the model is then proposed using the estimated parameters as well as the estimation of the underlying distribution of signals.

Keywords: Interdependent values; Auctions; Semi-parametric estimation; Faustmann rule; Optimal forest rotation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 D44 Q23 Q24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:forpol:v:80:y:2017:i:c:p:107-115

DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2017.02.004

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