Is there a connection between campaign contributions and legislative commitment? An empirical analysis on the cosponsorship activity of the 2007 Tree Act
Daowei Zhang and
Forest Policy and Economics, 2017, vol. 85, issue P1, 85-94
In this paper, we study whether interest groups use campaign contributions to influence legislative voting behavior in terms of bill cosponsorship. In particular, we look into the signature on the TREE (Timber Revitalization and Economic Enhancement) Act of 2007, which is the only major forestry act in the 2007–2008 Congress. We find evidence that suggests interest groups are using campaign contribution to influence bill cosponsorship as well as election results. Further, forestry interest groups do pay key committee (the Ways and Means Committee) members up front.
Keywords: Interest group theory; Campaign contributions; Cosponsorship; TREE Act; Timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:forpol:v:85:y:2017:i:p1:p:85-94
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