Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 151, issue C, 2025

Optimal tree contest design and winner-take-all pp. 1-23

Qian Jiao, Zhonghong Kuang, Yiran Liu and Yang Yu

The value of and demand for diverse news sources pp. 24-41

Evan Calford and Anujit Chakraborty

The prevalence of take-it-or-leave-it offers pp. 42-58

Shinsuke Kambe

Inefficiency in a frictionless market pp. 59-69

Keith Jin Deng Chan

Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts pp. 70-81

R. Pablo Arribillaga and Eliana Pepa Risma

An implementation of the general optimal mechanism in Esö and Szentes (2007) pp. 82-94

Dongri Liu and Jingfeng Lu

Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure pp. 95-107

Olivier Bos and Martin Pollrich

Learning in unprofitable games pp. 108-126

Andrea Gaunersdorfer and Josef Hofbauer

Fair division with subjective divisibility pp. 127-147

Xiaohui Bei, Shengxin Liu and Xinhang Lu

Stable mixing in Hawk–Dove Games under best experienced payoff dynamics pp. 148-161

Srinivas Arigapudi and Yuval Heller

Comparative statics of minimum-cost-spanning-tree games pp. 162-182

Zhibin Tan, Cao Zhigang and Zhengxing Zou

Accountability in Markovian elections pp. 183-217

John Duggan and Jean Guillaume Forand

Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance pp. 218-242

Jurjen Kamphorst and Vladimir Karamychev

Volume 150, issue C, 2025

A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices pp. 1-26

Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa

Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments pp. 27-33

Homa Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar and Mehdi Feizi

When is trust robust? pp. 34-47

Luca Anderlini, Larry Samuelson and Daniele Terlizzese

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem pp. 48-70

Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Massó and Shigehiro Serizawa

Taming selten's horse with impulse response pp. 71-92

Tibor Neugebauer, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Reinhard Selten

Supermodularity and incentive reversal in teams pp. 93-105

Svetlana Boyarchenko, Dominika Machowska and Iryna Topolyan

On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets pp. 106-130

Laura Doval and Balázs Szentes

Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis pp. 131-159

Mikhail Freer and Khushboo Surana

Ideological consistency and valence pp. 160-182

Enriqueta Aragonès and Dimitrios Xefteris

Efficient public good provision between and within groups pp. 183-190

Chowdhury Mohammad S Anwar, Jorge Bruno, Renaud Foucart and Sonali SenGupta

Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders pp. 191-196

Oleg Rubanov

Corrigendum to: “Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests” pp. 197-197

Zhonghong Kuang, Hangcheng Zhao and Jie Zheng

Endogenous network formation in local public goods: An experimental analysis pp. 198-214

Ying Chen, Tom Lane and Stuart McDonald

The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation pp. 215-234

Xiaoxiao Hu and Haoran Lei

Homophily and infections: Static and dynamic effects pp. 235-259

Matteo Bizzarri, Fabrizio Panebianco and Paolo Pin

The impact of perceived strength in the war of attrition pp. 260-277

David P. Myatt

Contracting with heterogeneous researchers pp. 278-294

Han Wang

Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations pp. 295-311

Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo

Computing agents' reputation within a network pp. 312-333

Federico Grigis, Sergio Ortobelli Lozza and Sebastiano Vitali

Foundation and identification of multi-attribute Shannon entropy pp. 334-355

David Walker-Jones

Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection pp. 356-364

Kimiyuki Morita, Akitoshi Muramoto and Takeharu Sogo

Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences pp. 365-386

Haoning Chen, Miaomiao Dong, Marc Henry and Ivan Sidorov

Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information pp. 387-400

Eric van Damme and Xu Lang

Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab pp. 401-414

Emanuel Kandel, Yevgeny Mugerman and Eyal Winter

Complementarity in matching markets and exchange economies pp. 415-435

Marzena Rostek and Nathan Yoder

Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances pp. 436-468

Lei Gao, Jingfeng Lu and Zhewei Wang

Priority, solidarity, and egalitarianism in the capability approach pp. 469-479

Inkee Jang and Biung-Ghi Ju

Nonparametric identification and estimation of the generalized second-price auction pp. 480-500

Ksenia Shakhgildyan

Deterrence in networks pp. 501-517

Leo Bao, Lata Gangadharan and C. Matthew Leister

On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games pp. 518-536

Rod Falvey, Tom Lane and Shravan Luckraz

The limits of identification in discrete choice pp. 537-551

Christopher Chambers and Christopher Turansick

Volume 149, issue C, 2025

Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games pp. 1-31

Sayan Mukherjee and Souvik Roy

Local public good equilibrium pp. 32-42

Nathan W. Chan and Anne van den Nouweland

Seemingly baseless discrimination pp. 43-55

Maciej Dudek

The economics of excuses: Job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests pp. 56-64

Ran Weksler and Boaz Zik

Strategic ambiguity in global games pp. 65-81

Takashi Ui

How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior: Cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment pp. 82-95

David Gill, Zachary Knepper, Victoria Prowse and Junya Zhou

Understanding dynamic interactions pp. 96-111

Konrad Grabiszewski and Alex Horenstein

Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles pp. 112-117

Dominik Karos and Shiran Rachmilevitch

Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games pp. 118-147

Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng and Yuhao Li

School choice with farsighted students pp. 148-163

Ata Atay, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function pp. 164-169

Shigehiro Serizawa and John A. Weymark

Status quo bias with choice overload pp. 170-186

Jiaqi Yang