Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2026

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 156, issue C, 2026

Choice and welfare under social constraints pp. 1-13

Mauricio Ribeiro

Provoking the opposition pp. 14-34

Korhan Kocak

Risk-taking in financial networks pp. 35-57

Mohamed Belhaj, Renaud Bourlès and Frédéric Deroïan

A note on the non-coincidence of the core and the bargaining set in many-to-one assignment markets pp. 58-63

Ata Atay, Marina Núñez and Tamás Solymosi

Improving the deferred acceptance with minimal compromise pp. 64-81

Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, Umut Dur, A. Arda Gitmez and Özgür Yılmaz

Marginal contribution and singleton cores in one-sided matching and assignment pp. 82-97

Hyunjun Cho, Jin Yeub Kim and Jaeok Park

Payoff continuity in games of incomplete information across models of knowledge pp. 98-108

Ashwin Kambhampati

Extensive form games with incentive stage-bidding: An emergence of non-cooperative cooperation pp. 109-134

Stéphane Le Roux and Valentin Goranko

When do prediction markets return average beliefs? Experimental evidence pp. 135-148

Marco Mantovani and Antonio Filippin

Naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play in games pp. 149-163

Bernardo García-Pola and Nagore Iriberri

Volume 155, issue C, 2026

The topology of poker pp. 1-9

Laurent Bartholdi and Roman Mikhailov

A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence pp. 10-26

Kiyong Yun and Youngsub Chun

A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts pp. 27-54

Rene Saran

Information design in the principal-agent problem pp. 55-69

Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi

Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice pp. 70-88

Gregorio Curello and Ludvig Sinander

The art of concession in General Lotto games pp. 89-106

Rahul Chandan, Keith Paarporn, Dan Kovenock, Mahnoosh Alizadeh and Jason R. Marden

Pricing skewed assets in multi-asset experimental markets pp. 107-148

Shuchen Zhao

Sequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value pp. 149-166

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, Ines Macho-Stadler and David Pérez-Castrillo

Rankings-dependent preferences: A real goods matching experiment pp. 167-191

Andrew Kloosterman and Peter Troyan

Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence pp. 192-211

Leonie Baumann

Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result pp. 212-227

Pedro Calleja and Francesc Llerena

Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms pp. 228-249

Xueheng Li

Preconvex games pp. 250-266

Eric Bahel, Christian Trudeau and Haoyu Wang

Corrigendum to “Values for environments with externalities – the average approach” [Games Econ. Behav. 108 (2018) 49–64.] pp. 267-269

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo and David Wettstein

Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices pp. 270-286

Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Tommy Andersson and Lars Ehlers

Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned pp. 287-309

Wataru Ishida and Changwoo Park

Exact Nash-like solutions of blockchain gap games pp. 310-320

Mitsunori Noguchi

Volume 154, issue C, 2025

Strategic mobilization of voters pp. 1-15

Guy Holburn and Davin Raiha

Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences pp. 16-52

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn and Seçkin Özbilen

A direct proof of the short-side advantage in random matching markets pp. 53-61

Simon Mauras, Paweł Prałat and Adrian Vetta

Naive analytics: The strategic advantage of algorithmic heuristics pp. 62-78

Ron Berman and Yuval Heller

Political salience, endogenous bandwagoning, and regime resilience pp. 79-96

Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Steffen Huck and Macartan Humphreys

Rationalizing sharing rules pp. 97-118

Karol Flores-Szwagrzak and Lars Peter Østerdal

Equilibrium and social norms pp. 119-128

Robert M. Anderson and Haosui Duanmu

Interest group information in elections pp. 129-148

Thea How Choon

Ambiguous persuasion: An ex-ante formulation pp. 149-158

Xiaoyu Cheng

Non-isolation, reversals, and social preference pp. 159-174

Paul H.Y. Cheung and Keaton Ellis

Material incentives and effort choice: Evidence from an online experiment across countries pp. 175-199

Elwyn Davies and Marcel Fafchamps

A concavity in the value of information pp. 200-207

Mark Whitmeyer

Approximately fair and population consistent budget division via simple payment schemes pp. 208-225

Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Xinhang Lu, Mashbat Suzuki and Jeremy Vollen

Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness pp. 226-245

Anna Bogomolnaia, Artem Baklanov and Elizaveta Victorova

Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams pp. 246-266

Saltuk Ozerturk and Huseyin Yildirim

Information unraveling and limited depth of reasoning pp. 267-284

Volker Benndorf, Dorothea Kübler and Hans-Theo Normann

BAR Nash equilibrium and application to blockchain design pp. 285-301

Olga Gorelkina, Rida Laraki and Maxime Reynouard

Reasoning about your own future mistakes pp. 302-328

Martin Meier and Andrés Perea

Evidence games: Lying aversion and commitment pp. 329-350

Elif B. Osun and Erkut Y. Ozbay

Stochastic adaptive learning with committed players in games with strict Nash equilibria pp. 351-376

Naoki Funai

Robust price discrimination pp. 377-395

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon and Moshe Tennenholtz

Unfounded opinion's curse pp. 396-410

King King Li and Toru Suzuki

Markovian persuasion with stochastic revelations pp. 411-439

Ehud Lehrer and Dimitry Shaiderman