Golden parachutes and shark repellents and shareholders' interests: Some new evidence

Atreya Chakraborty ()

Global Finance Journal, 2008, vol. 18, issue 3, 373-384

Abstract: In this paper we test for the motives for adopting golden parachutes and Anti-Takeover Amendments (ATAs). Firms that exhibited financial characteristics that were associated with a greater probability of hostile raids were also more likely to adopt golden parachutes or ATAs. We also find evidence to support the hypothesis that the adoption of golden parachutes and poison pills may in fact complement each other.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:glofin:v:18:y:2008:i:3:p:373-384

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