The effect of managerial entrenchment on analyst bias

Bahar Ulupinar

Global Finance Journal, 2018, vol. 37, issue C, 25-38

Abstract: While analyst bias is well documented, its relationship with corporate governance has been neglected. We claim that entrenched management of covered firms significantly increases analyst bias. By using governance index as a proxy for managerial entrenchment, we show that analyst bias increases as managerial entrenchment increases and affiliated analysts do not provide biased research for firms with the least and most entrenched managers due to their reputational capital concerns. Furthermore, our results show that as the channels managers use to pressure analysts get clogged after the regulations that took place between 2000 and 2003, entrenched managers' effect on analyst behavior disappeared.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Analyst Bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:glofin:v:37:y:2018:i:c:p:25-38

DOI: 10.1016/j.gfj.2018.04.001

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