 Executive compensation disclosure in emerging markets with weak shareholder enforcement: A multi-level analysisVagner Naysinger Machado, Igor Bernardi Sonza, Wilson Toshiro Nakamura, Johnny Silva Mendes and Marco Aurélio dos Santos Global Finance Journal, 2024, vol. 63, issue C Abstract: Using a quasi-experimental approach, this study examines the effect of the mandatory disclosure of executive compensation on the performance and liquidity of firms in emerging markets with weak legal protection such as Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Italy, and Spain. The results of the multi-level generalized linear models suggest that executive compensation disclosure positively impacts the accounting performance of firms in countries with weak legal protection. The findings also indicate that regulating such disclosure can help reduce agency problems. However, stricter executive compensation disclosure requirements do not impact market performance, as measured by the market-to-book ratio and Tobin's Q. In addition, there is a negative relationship between the regulation of executive compensation disclosure and the amount of cash retained by firms in countries with legal origins in French civil law. Keywords: Executive compensation disclosure; Emerging markets; Weak shareholder enforcement; Weak legal protection; Multi-level analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:glofin:v:63:y:2024:i:c:s1044028324001170 DOI: 10.1016/j.gfj.2024.101045 Access Statistics for this article Global Finance Journal is currently edited by Manuchehr Shahrokhi More articles in Global Finance Journal from Elsevier |
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