 Bundles: An opportunity to align incentives for continuing care in Canada?Jason M. Sutherland, Erik Hellsten and Kevin Yu Health Policy, 2012, vol. 107, issue 2, 209-217 Abstract: Over the past three decades, diagnosis related groups (DRG) have revolutionized hospital funding by successfully focusing hospitals attention on the ‘production’ process. However, using DRG for funding acute hospitals does little to create incentives outside of the hospital, or coordinate health care across providers and settings. With many health care quality and efficiency issues stemming from failures at the ‘seams’ in the system, there is increasing interest in creating new ‘bundles’ of care which includes acute and post-acute care services that align economic incentives for care coordination. Analysis of Ontario (Canada) datasets demonstrates that linking existing sources of clinical, administrative and cost data to create ‘bundles’ is technically feasible. However, key implementation challenges need to be addressed, such as administrative and contractual arrangements across multiple provider organizations, pricing and relations with physicians. Nonetheless, this analysis of Ontario data demonstrates that bundles provide an alternative policy option to DRG's in Canada's move toward activity-based funding. Keywords: Bundles; Diagnosis related groups (DRG); Health funding; Incentives; Post-acute care (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:107:y:2012:i:2:p:209-217 DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2012.02.007 Access Statistics for this article Health Policy is currently edited by Katrien Kesteloot, Mia Defever and Irina Cleemput More articles in Health Policy from Elsevier |
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