Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in primary care: An explanatory study among French general practitioners

Jonathan Sicsic, Marc Le Vaillant and Carine Franc

Health Policy, 2012, vol. 108, issue 2, 140-148

Abstract: Like many other OECD nations, France has implemented a pay-for-performance (P4P) model in primary care. However, the benefits have been debated, particularly regarding the possibly undesirable effects of extrinsic motivation (EM) on intrinsic motivation (IM).

Keywords: General practitioners; Intrinsic motivation; Extrinsic motivation; Payment for performance; Multiple correspondence analysis; Multilevel analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:108:y:2012:i:2:p:140-148

DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2012.08.020

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