Corporate governance, ownership and firm value: Drivers of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism

M. Belén Lozano, Beatriz Martínez and Julio Pindado

International Business Review, 2016, vol. 25, issue 6, 1333-1343

Abstract: This study analyses the role of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism. We study cross-national differences between companies with different level of investor protection. In addition, we account for the type of owner (young family vs. non-young family businesses) and the owner’s relationship with a second significant shareholder (monitoring vs. collusion). When the main owner has effective control over the firm (i.e., absolute control or less than absolute control but without the control of a second significant shareholder), the relation between ownership concentration and firm value is U-shaped. Our findings also suggest that the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders are weaker for companies with higher investor protection and young family-owned businesses.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Young family-owned business; Main owner; Expropriation; Firm value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iburev:v:25:y:2016:i:6:p:1333-1343

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.04.005

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