Advertising and the screening role of mass media

Susanne Kremhelmer and Hans Zenger

Information Economics and Policy, 2008, vol. 20, issue 2, 107-119

Abstract: We argue that there exists a problem of adverse selection in the provision of advertising which makes it impossible to establish direct markets for it. The media are regarded as intermediaries that can channel advertising and allocate it efficiently by screening consumers. This role of media may result in excessive quality and prices of media products. These distortions will be more severe if consumers' quality preferences are relatively homogenous.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-6245(07)00065-0
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:20:y:2008:i:2:p:107-119

Access Statistics for this article

Information Economics and Policy is currently edited by D. Waterman

More articles in Information Economics and Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().