The [`]Google effect' in the FCC's 700Â MHz auction

Sandro Brusco, Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo and Leslie Marx

Information Economics and Policy, 2009, vol. 21, issue 2, 101-114

Abstract: We describe and interpret bidding behavior in FCC Auction 73 for the C-block licenses. These licenses were initially offered subject to an open platform restriction, which was highly valued by firms such as Google. Google entered bids until its bids reached the C-block reserve price, thereby ensuring that the open platform restriction would be applied to the licenses. Later in the auction, other bidders outbid Google, so Google was able to trigger the open platform restriction without having to purchase any of the licenses.

Keywords: Spectrum; license; Contingent; re-auction; Open; access; Open; platform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Working Paper: The `Google Effect' in the FCC's 700 MHz Auction (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:101-114

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