Avoiding commercial piracy

Francisco MartI´nez-Sánchez
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francisco Martínez-Sánchez

Information Economics and Policy, 2010, vol. 22, issue 4, 398-408

Abstract: In this paper we analyse the roles of the government and an incumbent in preventing the entry of a pirate, who tries to avoid being caught. The framework of analysis used is a sequential duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with price competition. We find that both the government and the incumbent have key roles in preventing the entry of pirates. We show that the government will not help the incumbent to become a pure monopolist, even if it installs an antipiracy system. It will let the pirate enter either as a follower or a leader, or encourage the incumbent to set a low enough price to successfully deter the pirate from entering the market, depending on its technology for monitoring commercial piracy. Finally, we find that the pirate decides to become a leader to avoid being caught by the incumbent and the government.

Keywords: Commercial; piracy; Government; Incumbent; Pirate; Price; leadership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:22:y:2010:i:4:p:398-408

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