Saving newspapers with public grants – The effects of press subsidies on the provision of journalistic quality

Martin Leroch and Christian M. Wellbrock

Information Economics and Policy, 2011, vol. 23, issue 3, 281-286

Abstract: Many European governments subsidize their newspapers with the intention to guaranteeing high journalistic quality. Since journalistic quality is not defined by consumer preferences, increasing will not necessarily lead to benefits for all consumers. Based on this idea, the demand for a regional newspaper monopolist is modeled and the profit maximizing level of journalistic quality is analysed. We find that frequently used sales subsidies may be counter-productive as they can lead the newspaper to reduce journalistic quality.

Keywords: Media economics; Subsidies; Newspapers; Journalistic quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:23:y:2011:i:3:p:281-286

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2011.08.002

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