Competitively neutral universal service obligations

Axel Gautier () and Xavier Wauthy

Information Economics and Policy, 2012, vol. 24, issue 3, 254-261

Abstract: Universal service obligations impose specific costs on the universal service provider and the latter may call for an appropriate compensation. Most often, a two-step procedure is put forward to finance the universal service in a competitive environment. Firstly, the cost of the universal service is assessed; secondly, the provider must be compensated for this cost. We argue that this procedure is problematic because the implementation of a compensation scheme affects the behavior of market participants and leads to an overcompensation of the universal service provider. We put forward an alternative approach to this problem that fully acknowledges the distortions that result from the compensation mechanism.

Keywords: L43; L51; Universal service obligations; Cost-sharing mechanism; Competitive neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Competitively neutral universal service obligations (2012)
Working Paper: Competitively neutral universal service obligations (2010)
Working Paper: Competitively Neutral Universal Service Obligations (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:24:y:2012:i:3:p:254-261

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2012.04.001

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