Information provision and behaviour-based price discrimination

Romain de Nijs

Information Economics and Policy, 2013, vol. 25, issue 1, 32-40

Abstract: This article examines a model wherein firms first advertise their existence to consumers and, in the two following periods, compete with uniform pricing and then with behaviour-based price discrimination. I show that allowing firms to price discriminate can restore symmetry in equilibrium advertising decisions. I also establish that price discrimination increases (resp. decreases) profits and total welfare but hurts (resp. benefits) consumers when the advertising cost is high (resp. low).

Keywords: Price discrimination; Informative advertising; Mixed pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L11 L13 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:25:y:2013:i:1:p:32-40

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2013.01.003

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