Information acquisition and institutions: An organizational perspective
Travis Ng ()
Information Economics and Policy, 2013, vol. 25, issue 4, 301-311
Using a World Bank survey of Chinese firms, I construct a set of measures to capture the extent to which a firm involves outsiders in information acquisition. I find that firms that outsource more are not more likely to involve outsiders in acquiring information. Weakening contracting institutions raises the difficulty of safeguarding information leakage, more so when a firm involves outsiders in information acquisition than when no outsiders are involved. I test this prediction and find that firms under weaker contracting institutions are significantly less likely to involve outsiders in information acquisition.
Keywords: Information acquisition; Contracting institutions; Information leakage; Trade secrets; Theory of the firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:25:y:2013:i:4:p:301-311
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