Geographic access markets and investments

Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini and Steffen Hoernig

Information Economics and Policy, 2015, vol. 31, issue C, 13-21

Abstract: We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investment.

Keywords: Geographical access regulation; Wholesale competition; Infrastructure investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Working Paper: Geographic access markets and investments (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:31:y:2015:i:c:p:13-21

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.04.003

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