Online education, signaling, and human capital

Tim Perri

Information Economics and Policy, 2016, vol. 36, issue C, 69-74

Abstract: Online higher education may lower educational time cost for less able individuals more than for others. If education merely signals ability, decreasing education cost for the less able may decrease welfare by increasing over-investment in education by the more able. When education adds to human capital and may signal ability, decreasing education cost for the less able is more likely to increase welfare the smaller the productivity difference between the more and less able, and the smaller the fraction of the more able in the population.

Keywords: Signaling; Education cost; and Online education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:36:y:2016:i:c:p:69-74

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.06.001

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