The effects of strategic news sources on media coverage
Armando J. Garcia-Pires,
Hans Jarle Kind () and
Lars Sørgard ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Armando Jose Garcia Pires ()
Information Economics and Policy, 2017, vol. 41, issue C, 28-35
Media firms regularly depend on contacts with well-informed news sources when they cover business and government affairs. However, news sources might have their own agendas and prefer that some information is hidden from the public. In this paper, we model the relationship between news sources and media firms as informal contracts based on trust and punishment. The interactions between these two types of agents may have a significant impact on the completeness of news coverage in the media. Profit maximizing media firms may deliberately hide information from their audiences in order to maintain a long-term relationship with a source. We find that this cunning behavior might become more intensified the tougher the competitive pressure in the media market, since a newspaper risks to lose the source to a rival if it does not withhold information to please the source.
Keywords: News sources; Media bias; Informal contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:41:y:2017:i:c:p:28-35
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