Disclosure-based price discrimination by information exchange platforms

PingJing Bo and Agostino Manduchi

Information Economics and Policy, 2017, vol. 41, issue C, 54-66

Abstract: Consumers often face a trade off when considering whether to share more information with firms – for example, by letting an app access their list of contacts, location or browsing history. More precise information can help the sellers to make more targeted offers, and can yield multiple relevant offers and lower prices. However, information disclosure can entail costs via identity theft, fraud, extortion, etc. In this paper, we explore this trade-off in a model in which a monopoly platform can gather personal customer information, and offer it to other sellers. The consumers differ relatively to their aversion to information disclosure, and the platform can offer them menus with different disclosure levels. In equilibrium, options featuring greater disclosure levels command a premium, and information about the consumers choosing them is sold to the sellers at a lower price. If we compare scenarios with alternative menus, a greater number of options corresponds to a greater average disclosure level and a greater surplus. If the potential surplus from the induced exchanges is relatively large, equilibrium with a binary menu features levels of the platform’s profit and the surplus close to those achieved with a continuum of offers.

Keywords: Information disclosure; Two-sided platforms; Price discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:41:y:2017:i:c:p:54-66

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2017.08.003

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