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Co-investment, uncertainty, and opportunism:ex-Ante and ex-Post remedies

Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini, Steffen Hoernig and Ingo Vogelsang

Information Economics and Policy, 2021, vol. 56, issue C

Abstract: Caused largely by the recent technological changes towards digitalization, infrastructure investment in network industries has become the main issue for regulatory intervention. In this paper, we study the impact of co-investment between an incumbent and an entrant on the roll-out of network infrastructures under demand uncertainty. We show that if the entrant can wait to co-invest until demand is realized, the incumbent’s investment incentives are reduced, and total coverage can be lower than in a benchmark with earlier co-investment. We consider two remedies to correct these distortions: (i) co-investment options purchased ex ante by the entrant from the incumbent, and (ii) risk premia paid ex post by the entrant. We show that co-investment options cannot fully reestablish total coverage, while premia can do so in most cases, though at the cost of less entry. Finally, we show that an appropriate combination of ex-ante and ex-post remedies can improve welfare.

Keywords: Co-investment; Uncertainty; Opportunism; Options; Risk premia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Co-investment, uncertainty, and opportunism:ex-Ante and ex-Post remedies (2021)
Working Paper: Co-Investment, Uncertainty, and Opportunism: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Remedies (2020) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:56:y:2021:i:c:s0167624521000019

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2021.100913

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