Strategic data sales with partial segment profiling

Flavio Delbono, Carlo Reggiani and Luca Sandrini

Information Economics and Policy, 2024, vol. 68, issue C

Abstract: We analyse the incentives of a data broker to sell consumer-level data that enable personalised pricing to compete with firms when only a fraction of consumers — centred around one firm that we label “central” — are profiled. The central firm can potentially benefit from the data more than the rival ones (“peripheral”). We show that the data broker may decide not to sell the dataset to the central firm and instead trade with its peripheral competitors. In particular, we identify a strategic reaction of competitors that want to prevent that data increase competition.

Keywords: Data markets; Personalised pricing; Price discrimination; Oligopoly; Selling mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K21 L11 L13 L41 L86 M21 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:68:y:2024:i:c:s0167624524000246

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101102

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