Improving the cyber resilience of industrial control systems

Andrew Chaves, Mason Rice, Stephen Dunlap and John Pecarina

International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2017, vol. 17, issue C, 30-48

Abstract: Industrial control systems are designed to be resilient, capable of recovering from process faults and failures with limited impact on operations. Current industrial control system resilience strategies use redundant programmable logic controllers. However, these redundant programmable logic controllers, which typically are the same or similar makes and models as the primary controllers, can be exploited by the same cyber attacks that target the primary controllers.

Keywords: Cyber Resilience; Industrial Control Systems; Active Defense; Common Cause Failure; Wastewater Treatment System (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ijocip:v:17:y:2017:i:c:p:30-48

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijcip.2017.03.005

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