 Understanding the physical and economic consequences of attacks on control systemsYu-Lun Huang, Alvaro A. Cárdenas, Saurabh Amin, Zong-Syun Lin, Hsin-Yi Tsai and Shankar Sastry International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2009, vol. 2, issue 3, 73-83 Abstract: This paper describes an approach for developing threat models for attacks on control systems. These models are useful for analyzing the actions taken by an attacker who gains access to control system assets and for evaluating the effects of the attacker’s actions on the physical process being controlled. The paper proposes models for integrity attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and evaluates the physical and economic consequences of the attacks on a chemical reactor system. The analysis reveals two important points. First, a DoS attack does not have a significant effect when the reactor is in the steady state; however, combining the DoS attack with a relatively innocuous integrity attack rapidly causes the reactor to move to an unsafe state. Second, an attack that seeks to increase the operational cost of the chemical reactor involves a radically different strategy than an attack on plant safety (i.e., one that seeks to shut down the reactor or cause an explosion). Keywords: Control systems; Integrity attacks; Denial-of-service attacks; Consequences (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ijocip:v:2:y:2009:i:3:p:73-83 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijcip.2009.06.001 Access Statistics for this article International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection is currently edited by Leon Strous More articles in International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.