Financial frictions and policy cooperation: A case with monopolistic banking and staggered loan contracts

Ippei Fujiwara and Yuki Teranishi

Journal of International Economics, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 19-43

Abstract: Do financial frictions call for cross-border policy cooperation? This paper investigates the implications of financial frictions in the form of staggered loan contracts supplied by monopolistic banks, for monetary policy. Using the linear quadratic (LQ) framework, we show that policy cooperation yields long-run gains in addition to gains from stabilizing inefficient fluctuations over the business cycle, as usually found in models with price rigidities. The Ramsey optimal steady states differ between cooperation and noncooperation. Such gains from cooperation arise irrespective of capital account liberalization.

Keywords: Monetary policy in open economies; Financial frictions; Linear quadratic problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E50 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Financal frictions and policy cooperation: a case with monopolistic banking and staggered loan contracts (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:19-43

DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.09.004

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