Global banking and the international transmission of shocks: A quantitative analysis

José L. Fillat, Stefania Garetto and Arthur V. Corea-Smith

Journal of International Economics, 2023, vol. 145, issue C

Abstract: Regulatory reforms typically follow financial crises. We propose a model of global banking that can be used proactively to study alternative regulatory policies. The model mimics the US regulatory framework and highlights the organizational choices that banks face when entering a foreign market: branching versus subsidiarization. The model is able to replicate the response of the US banking sector to the European sovereign debt crisis. Counterfactual analysis suggests that pervasive subsidiarization, higher capital requirements, or an ad hoc monetary policy intervention would have avoided entirely the negative effects of the sovereign debt crisis on US lending. However, the same measures would have had limited effects in more severe scenarios.

Keywords: Global banks; Banking regulation; Shock transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 F36 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199623000946
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:145:y:2023:i:c:s0022199623000946

DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103808

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of International Economics is currently edited by Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier and Rodríguez-Clare, Andrés

More articles in Journal of International Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().