Globalization and domestic conflict

Michelle Garfinkel, Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos ()

Journal of International Economics, 2008, vol. 76, issue 2, 296-308

Abstract: When a resource like oil is domestically contested, trade patters and welfare can be very different than when property rights are costlessly enforced. Whereas (small-country) importers of the contested resource gain unambiguously relative to autarky, exporters of the contested resource lose under free trade, unless the world price of the resource is sufficiently high. Regardless of what price obtains in world markets, countries tend to over-export the contested resource compared to the absence of conflict. For a wide range of prices, higher international prices of the contested resource reduce welfare, an instance of the "natural resource curse."

Keywords: Trade; openness; Property; rights; Enforcement; Insecurity; Civil; wars (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Globalization and Domestic Conflict (2006)
Working Paper: Globalization and Domestic Conflict (2005)
Working Paper: Globalization and Domestic Conflict (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:76:y:2008:i:2:p:296-308

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