Hares and stags in Argentinean debt restructuring

Christian Engelen and Johann Graf Lambsdorff

Journal of International Economics, 2009, vol. 78, issue 1, 141-148

Abstract: The latest Argentinean debt restructuring was the first time the resolution of a modern financial crisis was completely handed over to the private financial markets without official intervention by public institutions. We argue that the resulting harshest haircut for private creditors in history can be at least partially related to a stag-hunt game played by creditors. We show that incentive schemes provided by the Argentinean government were factors facilitating this haircut. The analysis suggests that, contrary to the recognition in the literature, the effects of Collective Action Clauses and Exit Consents within a restructuring process are not equal. In the case of Argentina, the inclusion of Collective Action Clauses in the defaulted bonds could have benefited the holdout creditors.

Keywords: Sovereign; debt; restructuring; Coordination; failures; Collective; action; clauses; Exit; consents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:78:y:2009:i:1:p:141-148

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