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Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance

Rune Hagen ()

Journal of International Economics, 2009, vol. 79, issue 1, 126-136

Abstract: I analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt. I show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare. However, with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs. private lenders' profits. Multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem -- that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit.

Keywords: Multilateral; financial; institutions; Surveillance; Sovereign; debt; Cheap; talk; Signalling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:79:y:2009:i:1:p:126-136