Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs

Emine Boz

Journal of International Economics, 2011, vol. 83, issue 1, 70-82

Abstract: The data reveal that emerging market sovereign borrowing from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is small, intermittent and countercyclical compared to that from private sector creditors. The IFI loan contracts offered to sovereigns differ from the private ones in that they are more enforceable and have conditionality arrangements attached to them. Taking these contractual differences as given, this paper builds a quantitative model of a sovereign borrower and argues that better enforceability of IFI loan contracts is the main institutional feature that explains the size and cyclicality while conditionality accounts for the intermittency of borrowing from the IFIs.

Keywords: Emerging; markets; Sovereign; debt; and; default; IFIs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

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Working Paper: Sovereign Default, Private Sector Creditors and the IFIs (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:83:y:2011:i:1:p:70-82

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