Optimal tariffs, retaliation, and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model

Gabriel Felbermayr, Benjamin Jung and Mario Larch

Journal of International Economics, 2013, vol. 89, issue 1, 13-25

Abstract: This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros (JIE, 1987). The optimal tariff internalizes a mark-up distortion, an entry distortion, and a terms‐of-trade externality. It is larger when the dispersion of firm-level productivities is higher, and the country's relative size or relative average productivity is bigger. Furthermore, in the two-country Nash equilibrium, tariffs turn out to be strategic substitutes. Small or poor economies set lower Nash tariffs than large or rich ones. Lower transportation costs or smaller fixed market entry costs induce higher equilibrium tariffs and larger welfare losses relative to the case of zero tariffs. Similarly, cross-country productivity or size convergence, and higher firm-level productivity dispersion increase the global welfare loss due to non-cooperative tariff policies. These results suggest that post WWII trends have increased the relative merits of the WTO.

Keywords: Optimal tariffs; Tariff wars; Heterogeneous firms; World Trade Organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (118)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199612001195
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal tariffs, retaliation, and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model (2013)
Working Paper: Optimal Tariffs, Retaliation and the Welfare Loss from Tariff Wars in the Melitz Model (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:89:y:2013:i:1:p:13-25

DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.06.001

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of International Economics is currently edited by Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier and Rodríguez-Clare, Andrés

More articles in Journal of International Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().