Sources of disagreement in inflation forecasts: An international empirical investigation
Pierre Siklos ()
Journal of International Economics, 2013, vol. 90, issue 1, 218-231
Central to the conduct of monetary policy are inflation forecasts. Inflation forecasts are not unique. Central banks and professional organizations generate inflation forecasts while households are surveyed about their inflation outlook. This paper estimates inflation forecast disagreement for nine economies over the 1999–2009 period, five of which target inflation. I find that central bank transparency tends to increase forecast disagreement. To the extent this reflects the attention paid to inflation performance the implication is that transparency is beneficial. Moreover, this finding does not appear to be a feature that applies only to central banks that must adhere to an inflation target.
Keywords: Forecast disagreement; Central bank transparency; Inflation; Quantile regression; Panel regression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 C53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Sources of Disagreement in Inflation Forecasts: An International Empirical Investigation (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:90:y:2013:i:1:p:218-231
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