Economic analysis of process innovation: The case study of the German telecommunication market

Chuan Yang and Yasuo Kawashima

Innovation and Green Development, 2024, vol. 3, issue 1

Abstract: The effects of a new firm's entry into the telecom service market are examined further. These consist of up- and downstream markets, corresponding to the first and second stages in game theory. When a new entrant can succeed in process innovation and lower production cost, entry of the entrant transforms the market structure into a Joint-Profit-Maximization monopoly under the European Commission (EC) constraint. However, the post-entry market becomes more competitive if the EC did not intervene the market. We observed that violation of the test does not necessarily mean the incumbent practices a margin squeeze. The EC does not prove that margin squeeze is a necessary and sufficient condition for the exit. Furthermore, Joint-Profit-Maximization monopoly can serve to explain why Japanese Telecoms fees are high.

JEL-codes: L13 L43 L51 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2949753123000632
Open-access

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ingrde:v:3:y:2024:i:1:s2949753123000632

DOI: 10.1016/j.igd.2023.100095

Access Statistics for this article

Innovation and Green Development is currently edited by Hai-Jie Wang and Chun-Ping Chang

More articles in Innovation and Green Development from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().