The influence of transportation costs and environmental damage on social welfare under asymmetric multi-market mixed oligopoly

Akio Kawasaki and Tohru Naito

Innovation and Green Development, 2024, vol. 3, issue 3

Abstract: This study investigates how transportation costs and environmental damage affect social welfare and the optimal degree of nationalization by assuming asymmetric mixed oligopoly markets. It assumes that both transportation costs and environmental damage are incurred when products are transported regionally. We find that even if transportation costs or environmental damage decrease, social welfare does not always improve under full nationalization. Next, this study examines how transportation costs and environmental damage affect the optimal degree of nationalization. We find that the optimal degree of nationalization does not always increase with transportation costs and environmental damage. Explaining how transportation costs and environmental damage affect socially preferable privatization policy is important because previous studies on partial privatization have not discussed their influence.

Keywords: Environmental damage; Mixed duopoly; Transportation costs; Multi-regional markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 J13 Q59 R31 R32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2949753124000146
Open-access

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ingrde:v:3:y:2024:i:3:s2949753124000146

DOI: 10.1016/j.igd.2024.100137

Access Statistics for this article

Innovation and Green Development is currently edited by Hai-Jie Wang and Chun-Ping Chang

More articles in Innovation and Green Development from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().