A comparison of two legislative approaches to the pay-as-you-go pension system in terms of adequacy. The Italian case

Anna Attias, Maria Felice Arezzo (), Augusto Pianese and Zoltan Varga

Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 2016, vol. 68, issue C, 203-211

Abstract: The aim of our work is to evaluate a new legislative proposal of the Italian pension system due to Giuliano Cazzola e Tiziano Treu and to compare it with the system in force due to former Minister Elsa Fornero. The evaluation is made in terms of adequacy. We make use of a mathematical model which, under the hypothesis of demographic equilibrium, formalizes the legislative changes of the pay-as-you-go pension system. The model is tested using Italian demographic and socio-economic data.

Keywords: Pay-as-you-go pension systems; Contribution rate; Population-based replacement rate; Adequacy; Demographic equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:insuma:v:68:y:2016:i:c:p:203-211

DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2016.03.010

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