The listing and delisting of German firms on NYSE and NASDAQ: Were there any benefits?

Wolfgang Bessler, Fred R. Kaen, Philipp Kurmann and Jan Zimmermann

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2012, vol. 22, issue 4, 1024-1053

Abstract: From 1990 through 2005 18 German firms listed their shares in the U.S. in the hopes of increasing their market values and lowering their cost of capital. We examine whether these anticipated benefits materialized and find the companies obtained no valuation benefits from their listings. The absence of valuation benefits may explain why 13 firms have delisted since 2006 once Rule 12h-6 was adopted that enabled firms to delist without having to continue to file reports with the SEC. Other factors were the passage of SOX, changes in German corporate governance laws and the emergence of alternative trading platforms.

Keywords: Cross listing; Delisting; Market segmentation; Bonding theories; Cost of capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G15 G18 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443112000030
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intfin:v:22:y:2012:i:4:p:1024-1053

DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2012.01.001

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money is currently edited by I. Mathur and C. J. Neely

More articles in Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().